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Society suffers when antimonopoly laws and antimonopoly enforcement are
either too lax or too stringent. If they are too lax, consumers pay higher prices,
as, for example, competing firms merge or collude with impunity, and dominant
firms effectively bar entry into their markets by erecting vertical restraints. If
they are too stringent, consumers also pay higher prices, as, for example, those
charged with enforcement stultify entrepreneurial initiative through their bureau-
cratic attempts to control prices and outputs, punish successful entrants into new
markets for earning high profits or harming existing firms, and forbid firms that
lack market power from extending their vertical scope of operations to its most
efficient level.
In assessing the success with which the drafters of a competition law have
walked this fine line, experience and economic theory provide several compo-
nents of the law that serve as critical determinants and indicators. Both experi-
ence and theory also suggest that understanding the text of the law itself is only
the first step in understanding how the law will affect businesses, consumers, and
society; one must also know how the law will be enforced by the competition
agencies and interpreted by the courts. At this time, the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe have little such experience, so it is to the language of the laws
itself that we must turn for indications of the degree to which enforcement of the
laws will help rather than hinder competition and welfare.
*Chief, Competition Policy Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice.
**The Editorial Reviewer for this article was Wade Channell.
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To analyze a new competition law's implications for welfare, consider the
following seven questions:
(1) Does the law distinguish between horizontal and vertical agreements?
(2) Does the law treat naked cartel arrangements as per se illegal?
(3) Does the law restrict vertical agreements by firns lacking market power?
(4) Do the provisions restricting the behavior of "dominant" firms make it
too easy for a firm to be labelled dominant?
(5) Does the law protect potential entrants from exclusionary behavior by
incumbent firms?
(6) Is it illegal to harm a competitor?
(7) Does the law seek to control the prices charged by dominant firms?
This article addresses these questions to four competition laws recently enacted
in Central and Eastern Europe-those of the Czech and Slovak Federated Re-
public (hereinafter the CSFR), Hungary, Poland, and Russia.' Foreign firms
interested in doing business in these countries should use these questions as a
basis for evaluating whether behavior that would be regarded as blameless in
other countries would be punishable under these laws. Alternatively, the ques-
tions and the answers discussed below may be taken as admonitions to those
making the enforcement decisions at the agencies and the interpretation decisions
in the courts.
I. Background
The competition laws of the CSFR, Hungary, Poland, and Russia have all been
enacted and come into force since early 1990.2 The laws have broad structural
similarities, focusing their principal operational provisions on agreements among
firms, dominant firm behavior, and mergers and organizational restructuring. The
1. As Andrew Gavil has pointed out, the following discussion is based on the assumption that
the rationale for antimonopoly statutes is the enhancement of welfare, as that word is used by
neoclassical economists. A separate and interesting inquiry could focus on the extent to which the
statutes may be read as in fact directed toward this particular goal. See also Eleanor Fox & Janusz
Ordover, Free Enterprise and Competition Policy for Central and East Europe and the Soviet Union
(1991) (unpublished paper):
We assume . . . that the nations want economic viability and that they do not mean to compromise this goal, or
not very much, by nationalistic and protectionist tradeoffs. If we are wrong and if the main goal of the nations or
some of them is to incubate a developing economy or to protect against inequality, then our recommendations
would have limited meaning to the nation; our analysis could nonetheless be helpful by making costs more
transparent.
2. The Polish Law on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices was enacted on February 24, 1990,
and came into force "20 days after its publication" [hereinafter Polish Law]. The Hungarian Act on
Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices was enacted on November 20, 1990, and came into force on
January 1, 1991 [hereinafter Hungarian Law]. The CSFR Competition Protection Act was enacted on
January 30, 1991, and came into force on March 1, 1991 [hereinafter CSFR Law]. The Russian Law
on Competition and the Limitation of Monopolistic Activity on Goods Markets was enacted on
April 16, 1991, and came into force the following month [hereinafter Russian Law]. For discussions
of the background to the laws, see Fox & Ordover, supra note 1; James Langenfeld & Marsha W.
Blitzer, Is Competition Policy the Last Thing Central and Eastern Europe Need? 6 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 347 (1991).
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Hungarian and Russian laws attack "unfair" or "unscrupulous" competition;
the CSFR and Polish laws do not. The Polish and Russian laws empower the
competition agency to order involuntary breakups of monopolistic firms; the
Hungarian law does not, while the CSFR law requires the appropriate republic-
level Ministry of Privatization to seek the approval of the appropriate republic-
level Office for Economic Competition before approving the privatization plan
for individual firms.
The laws are closer in spirit and structure to the competition law of the
European Community than to that of the United States, particularly in their
delineation of specific individual business practices that are forbidden; U.S. law
is written in more general terms, with the case law developing the specific
strictures. 3 Not surprisingly, given the current economic structure in Central and
Eastern Europe, the new laws also tend to focus more than U.S. law on con-
trolling the behavior of dominant firms.
The following discussion considers and compares critical provisions of these
laws in terms of the questions posed above.
II. Assessing the Implications of Antimonopoly Laws
A. AGREEMENTS: HORIZONTAL VERSUS VERTICAL
Agreements among firms in the same market not to compete are among the
most harmful of antitrust offenses. These agreements, termed "horizontal" be-
cause they involve firms at the same level in the production chain, by constrain-
ing or eliminating independent competition actions on the part of sellers typically
reduce the choices available to consumers and result in higher costs and higher
prices. Commentators and scholars conclude almost unanimously that, with an
exception to be noted below, such agreements should be prosecuted aggressively
by competition authorities. 4
3. See ROGER BONER & REINALD KRUEGER, THE BASICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY: A REVIEW OF
TEN NATIONS AND ThE EEC (World Bank, Indus. Series Paper No. 42, Feb. 1991); Eleanor M. Fox,
Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency,
Opportunity and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 981 (1986); Heidi Kroll, Monopoly and Tran-
sition to the Market, 7 SOVIET ECONOMY 143, 149-50 (1991); Ingo Schmidt, Different Approaches
and Problems in Dealing with Control of Market Power: A Comparison of German, European and
U.S. Policy Towards Market-Dominating Enterprises, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 417 (1983). One Eastern
European reader of this article in manuscript has pointed out that some of the statutory provisions of
which I am critical are similar to provisions in the EC competition statutes.
4. Adam Smith wrote the classic, and most-quoted, statement of condemnation:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though
the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to
facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, vol. 1, at 143
(Liberty Classics edition, R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, W. B. Todd eds., 1981). See also ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 263 (1978):
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No such consensus exists on the subject of agreements between firms and their
customers or suppliers, termed "vertical" because they involve firms at different
levels in the production chain. Many commentators believe that vertical arrange-
ments are harmful to society if they are made by firms holding large market
shares in markets with entry barriers and reduce the availability of independent
suppliers, customers, or distributors.5 Most commentators believe that vertical
agreements among firms with no market power do not harm society. 6 Serious
disagreement exists on the subject of where to draw the line between those
vertical agreements that are harmful and those that are benign. 7
There is very little disagreement, however, that the competitive implications of
horizontal and vertical agreements demand different kinds of analysis. 8 A com-
petition law that does not distinguish between the two will require careful de-
velopment of enforcement policies and court interpretations to avoid confusion
among entrepreneurs and other business people.
The CSFR law is an example of a law that does not make the horizontal-
vertical distinction. The law forbids "agreements and other forms of mutual
understanding achieved by entrepreneurs which result . . . in the elimination or
restriction of economic competition." 9 The law proceeds to forbid "in particu-
lar" price fixing, the limitation or control of production or technological devel-
opment, market division, agreements to use tying arrangements, agreements to
discriminate among customers, and agreements to limit access to the markets to
There are . . . hundreds of. .. cases in which the doctrine of per se illegality for eliminations of rivalry . . has
been applied, and without doubt thousands of cartels have been made less effective and other thousands have never
been broached because of the overhanging threat of this rule. Its contributions to consumer welfare over the
decades have been enormous.
5. See, e.g., DENNIS CARLTON & JEFFREY PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537
(1990); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 193-98 (1988); Janusz A. Ordover
et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Marius Schwartz & David
Eisenstadt, Vertical Restraints, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Pol. Off. Disc. Paper
82-8, at 15-26 (rev. 1983).
6. See, e.g., FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS 31 (1978);
THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 264-72 (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989); Rich-
ard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 298-99 (1975);
Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977); Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market
Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953
(1979).
7. Compare, e.g., Bork, supra note 4, chs. 14-15, 19 (arguing that most vertical agreements
and restraints are benign) with F. M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ch. 15 (3d ed. 1990) (arguing that this position is extreme and simplistic).
See also Michael L. Katz, Vertical Contractual Relations, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION 655-721 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
8. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1976);
WARREN-BOULTON, supra note 6, at 105; Schwartz & Eisenstadt, supra note 5, at 2-9; Russell W.
Pittman, Antimonopolni z6kony v rozvjejtctse trzn( ekonomice (Antimonopoly Laws in a Developing
Market Economy), NAROYEDI HoSPODARSTVI No. 8 (1991).
9. CSFR Law, supra note 2, art. 3(1).
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parties not joining in the agreement. '0 While the first three of these provisions
appear to have been written with horizontal arrangements in mind, it would be
easy to apply them to vertical arrangements as well, thus providing harsher
treatment than may have been intended for, for example, resale price mainte-
nance, agreements by distributors to sell minimum quantities of a manufacturer's
product, or territorial restrictions imposed upon distributors by manufacturers.
Similarly, a provision in the section of the law listing certain kinds of agreements
that are exempt from the prohibition cites "contracts concerning . . . the grant-
ing of a rebate as long as it represents genuine compensation for performance and
does not lead to discrimination among customers." 1 This provision is obviously
aimed at protecting from antimonopoly attack vertical contracts that include
rebates (so long as they do not represent discrimination). As written, however,
it would also appear to protect horizontal agreements to grant rebates to
customers-a form of price fixing.
The Polish law makes some distinction between horizontal and vertical agree-
ments, but the line is not a clear one. The law prohibits agreements between
competitors that set prices or methods of formulating prices, 12 but it also pro-
hibits all agreements to divide markets, limit the volume of production or sales,
or limit market access by firms not part of the agreement,' 3 without regard to
whether the agreeing parties are competitors.
In contrast, the Hungarian and Russian laws make the distinction clear and
complete. Each has a separate provision addressing just horizontal agreements. 14
The Hungarian law states that "competitors are prohibited to coordinate their
business conduct and to reach an agreement . . . which may result in the re-
striction or exclusion of economic competition." 15 It proceeds to address this
prohibition:
especially ... to the setting of the commodity's price, the division of the market or the
exclusion of a defined circle of consumer from the purchase and/or sale of some
commodities, restriction of the options for sources of purchase or sales opportunities,
restriction of the output of a commodity, restriction of technical development, preven-
tion of access to the market and to bringing a market operator into a disadvantageous
position. "
No specific section of the law deals with vertical agreements, although section
20, which regulates the behavior of dominant firms, includes some restrictions on
vertical agreements.
The Russian law prohibits "agreements (coordinated actions) between com-
peting economic subjects . . . occupying together a dominant position in the
10. Id. art. 3(2).
11. Id. art. 3(3)(c).
12. Polish Law, supra note 2, art. 4(2)(1).
13. Id. art. 4(2).
14. Hungarian Law, supra note 2, §§ 14-18; Russian Law, supra note 2, art. 6(1).
15. Hungarian Law, supra note 2, § 14(1).
16. Id. § 14(2).
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market. . . if such agreements (coordinated actions) have as their result, or may
have, a significant limitation of competition."' 7 The law then lists as examples
of prohibited horizontal agreements those that set prices or price terms, divide
markets, or exclude other firms from the market. 18 A separate section of the law
(article 6(2)) addresses vertical agreements.
It appears, then, that the Hungarian and Russian laws are in this respect more
encouraging to foreign investment than the CSFR and Polish laws, since they
provide greater clarity concerning the treatment of vertical restraints. However,
this conclusion is tempered below by an examination of the degree to which the
laws allow firms without market power to engage in such restraints.
B. AGREEMENTS: PER SE TREATMENT OF CARTEL AGREEMENTS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the principal U.S. law addressing anticompet-
itive agreements, prohibits "every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." 19 In spite of the
sweeping nature of this language, many kinds of agreements among competitors
are subject to a delicate judicial and prosecutorial balancing as to whether the
welfare losses arising from the restrictions that they impose on competition are
outweighed by any welfare gains arising from the agreement. 20 However, some
other forms of agreements among competitors, namely, agreements to set prices,
to divide territories, or to allocate customers, if not ancillary to some procom-
petitive agreement like a joint venture, are considered so clearly harmful that no
judicial balancing is required. These types of agreements are illegal per se, and
all that is necessary for conviction is proof that an agreement existed. 2 1
The distinction in the United States between horizontal agreements that are
illegal per se and those that are subject to a "rule of reason" analysis has been
clarified through court decisions interpreting the Sherman Act. This distinction
is important in two ways: (1) it provides certainty for economic actors by clearly
defining certain behavior as illegal; and (2) it creates economy of enforcement
17. Russian Law, supra note 2, art. 6(1).
18. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
20. A joint venture among competitors is one example of an agreement subject to this kind of
analysis. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1265
(1979), aff'd sub nom. Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981); ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND) 49-53 (2d ed. 1984).
21. See National Society of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978):
There are ... two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first category are agreements whose
nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to
establish their illegality-they are 'illegalper se.' In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect
can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons
why it was imposed.
See also Northern Pac. Ry., Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "[T]here are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elab-
orate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
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resources by limiting the kinds of agreement that must be examined in detail for
ultimate economic effect. If these benefits are to accrue to the societies of Central
and Eastern Europe, they must likewise result from court or administrative
decision, because this distinction appears in none of the laws here examined. All
of the laws allow defendants accused of participating in any illegal horizontal
agreement to demonstrate the public benefits of the agreement, and if successful,
to avoid punishment.
The Polish and Russian laws contain the most straightforward provisions for
this type of defense. The Polish law states simply that the agreements described
are illegal "unless they are necessary to conduct an economic activity and do not
induce a substantial limitation of competition." 22 The Russian law exempts
agreements "if the economic subjects concluding such agreements (taking such
actions) show that they promoted, or will promote, the saturation of the goods
market, the improvement of the consumer qualities of goods, and (or) an increase
in their competitiveness, including on the international market." 23
The CSFR law states that the prohibition in article 3(2) of certain kinds of
agreements does not apply to contracts concerning:
(a) uniform application of conditions of trade, supply, or payment, excluding
contracts on prices or their components,
(b) rationalization of economic activity, particularly its specialization, pro-
vided it does not lead to substantial restriction of competition in the
market,
(c) the granting of a rebate as long as it represents genuine compensation for
performance and does not lead to discrimination among customers,
24
(d) a share in supplying the market less than 5 percent of the respective
republican market or less than 30 percent of the local market supplied
regularly by the parties to the contract.25
The Hungarian law does not prohibit a horizontal agreement "intended to
prevent the abuse of an economic superiority," 26 that is, apparently, agreements
that seek to create market power to counteract market power already enjoyed by
22. Polish Law, supra note 2, art. 6.
23. Russian Law, supra note 2, art. 6(3).
24. See the discussion supra in part II.A. concerning the confusion that may be caused by this
provision.
25. CSFR Law, supra note 2, art. 3(3). There is some distinction in the CSFR law between forms
of agreement that are not illegal (Id. art. 3(3)) and forms of agreements for which the parties may
receive advance approval from the Office for Economic Competition (Id. art. 5). Such approval
"must not exceed limits necessary to satisfy public interest, and it is required that special attention
be paid to the interests of customers." Id. art. 5(2). In addition,
the contract in question ... [mayl not contain commitments
I. to sell exclusively such goods which are the object of the contract,
2. to sell goods which are either identical or commutable with the goods constituting the object of the contract
exclusively subject to certain price or volume restrictions,
3. to exclude certain entrepreneurs in the sale of goods or supply of services which constitutes the object of the
contract, even if they are willing to meet prescribed conditions. provided their qualification meets the requirements
of valid regulations.
Id. art. 5(3).
26. Hungarian Law, supra note 2, § 15(l)(a).
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another firm. (Whether this other firm would be in a horizontal or vertical
relationship with the parties to the agreement is not stated.) It does not prohibit
an agreement "if the parties concluding it have together a less than 10 percent
share of the total respective market. ' 27 It does not prohibit an agreement if:
"(a) the concomitant restriction or exclusion of economic competition does not
exceed the extent required for achieving the economically justified common
targets; and (b) the advantages exceed the disadvantages associated with it." 28 In
turn, the following are qualified as being advantages from the point of view of
exemption from the prohibition:
(a) a favorable development of the prices; or
(b) an improvement of the product's quality or the maintenance of the high
quality already achieved; or
(c) an improvement of the conditions of delivery . . . ; or
(d) a shortening of the way of distribution, a more rational development of
the purchase- and sales-organizations, an improvement in the supply of
the given product; or
(e) promotion of technological development, of the environmental situation
or enhancement of competitivity on external markets.
29
Thus, as these laws are written, any horizontal agreement, even the most
naked and straightforward agreement to set prices or rig bids among competitors,
may be entered into and honored with the hope that the antimonopoly authorities
may be convinced that it is, to use the Polish example, "necessary to conduct an
economic activity and . . . [does] not induce a substantial limitation of compe-
tition. ' 30 Deterrence may be compromised, and the enforcement agencies and
courts may be crowded with cartel members arguing that their cartel prices are
"reasonable" 3' or that absent the agreement competition in this industry would
be "ruinous."
32
27. Id. §§ 15(l) (b), 16(1).
28. Id. § 17(1).
29. Id. § 17(2). The exemption for agreements which improve the "environmental situation"
may be especially troublesome, since agreements to raise prices are likely to result in lower levels of
production, which are likely to result in lower levels of pollution.
30. Polish Law, supra note 2, art. 6.
31. This was a common defense in the early days of U.S. antitrust enforcement. See United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927):
The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix
arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes
become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.... Agreements which create such potential power may well be held
to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a
particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government in enforcing the
Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere
variation of economic conditions.
32. This was another common early defense. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 221 (1940):
Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting and the like appear throughout our history as
ostensible justifications for price-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the rea-
sonableness of prices would necessarily become an issue in every price fixing case. In that event the Sherman Act
would soon be emasculated .... Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular
price.fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive.
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Similarly, parties to a horizontal agreement in the CSFR or Hungary, even if
they could demonstrate no public benefits at all from the agreement, could hope
and seek to escape prosecution by demonstrating that their collective market
shares were below the threshold levels of the law. Since a significant portion of
the time and resources devoted to U.S. antitrust cases concerns the issue of the
definition of the market, these de minimus exceptions to the strictures of the law
may cause considerable uncertainty. 33 The fledgling market economies would be
better served by stronger and clearer rules. 34
C. AGREEMENTS: ARE FIRMS WITHOUT MARKET POWER
FREE TO MAKE VERTICAL AGREEMENTS?
As noted above, most commentators on U.S. law have concluded that vertical
restraints and agreements involving firms without market power cannot harm wel-
fare and so should be permitted. United States courts have moved in this direction,
with the GTE Sylvania decision35 decreeing that, since vertical nonprice restrictions
can increase efficiency and reduce costs at the same time that they reduce some
forms of competition, they should be analyzed under a rule of reason rather than
treated as illegal per se. 36 On the other hand, vertical restraints on price, for exam-
ple, resale price maintenance, are still subject to per se illegality,37 in spite of
widespread scholarly opinion that such restraints are, at worst, no more likely to be
socially harmful than are vertical nonprice restraints.
38
33. For example, does Coca-Cola operate in the market for cola soft drinks, for all soft drinks,
or for all beverages? See Lawrence J. White, Application of the Merger Guidelines: The Proposed
Merger of Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 80-98. Does
the Santa Fe Railway operate in the market for railway freight transportation or for all freight
transportation? See Russell W. Pittman, Railroads and Competition: The Santa Fe/Southern Pacific
Merger Proposal, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 25 (1990). Answers to these questions may make an enormous
difference in the measured market shares of the firms. For a general discussion of the difficult issues
involved, see Gregory G. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guide-
lines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514; Gregory J. Wesden, Market Delineation Under the Merger Guidelines:
A Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group
Disc. Paper 92-1 (1992).
34. See also Dep. Ass't Att'y Gen. Robert D. Willig, Anti-Monopoly Policies and Institutions,
Remarks to Conference on The Transition to a Market Economy, Institutional Aspects, Institutional
Reform and Informal Sector, Institute for Policy Reform, Prague, CSFR (Mar. 24-27, 1991) in THE
EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 191 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C.
Rausser eds., 1992) [hereinafter EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES]:
In view of the critical importance of competitive conduct to an emerging free market economy, there is a strong
case for an anti-monopoly law that includes bright-line rules against cartel behavior.... Only in this way can the
government deliver the clear and powerful statement of what business conduct is expected, and what is forbidden,
and thereby make plain the linkage between the drive for free markets and the requisite new business code of
conduct.
35. Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
36. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 68-72.
37. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
38. Frederick Warren-Boulton, Resale Price Maintenance Reexamined: Monsanto v. Spray-Rite,
in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 371-404.
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Some vertical nonprice restraints, for example, tying arrangements and ex-
clusive distributorship arrangements, may be especially useful as devices to
facilitate entry. 39 Since the markets of Central Europe are for the most part in
serious need of entry, and since a new entrant into a market has by definition no
market power in any meaningful sense, these countries would benefit from
competition laws that exempt from prosecution vertical agreements involving
firms without market power.
To what extent can the competition laws of the countries under discussion be
so characterized? Subject to some concerns about how a firm is characterized as
a dominant firm (which is addressed below), the answer is: to a large extent. The
Russian law's provision concerning vertical agreements is the most straightfor-
ward in this respect; it reads simply as follows:
Agreements (coordinated actions) concluded in any form, between noncompeting eco-
nomic subjects, one of which occupies a dominant position (in the market), and the
other of which is its supplier or customer, if such agreements (coordinated actions) have
or may have as their result a significant limitation of competition, shall be forbidden and
held void by the established procedure, in whole or in part.4 °
In addition, the provisions of the law that address the behavior of dominant firms
forbid such firms from engaging in tying arrangements or discriminatory prac-
tices.41
The CSFR law, as noted above, exempts all agreements, horizontal or vertical,
from prosecution if the agreements concern firms with low market shares. In
addition, as in the Russian law, tying arrangements and discrimination between
customers are illegal, but only if engaged in by dominant firms.
42
The Polish and Hungarian laws are somewhat less satisfactory in this respect.
Both prohibit certain vertical actions by dominant firms (for example, discrim-
ination in the Polish law, taking actions to block entrants in both laws), but both
also prohibit tying arrangements imposed by any firm, regardless of market share
or market power.4 3 Since tying is probably not harmful to society when engaged
39. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
330 (1961); William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and
Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1437-38 (1967-1968); Lee E. Preston, Restrictive Distri-
bution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
506, 522 (1965); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J.L. & ECON. 86,
94-96, 104-05 (1960). Discussions in the context of a particular industry are in Arthur D. Austin
& Elinor Harris Solomon, The Antitrust Implications of Compensating Balances, 58 VA. L. REV. 1,
61 (1972) (banking) and Jost J. Schmitt, Antitrust and Distribution Problems in Tight Oligopolies,
A Case Study of the Automobile Industry, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 849, 909-10 (1972-1973) (automo-
biles). Examples of such a use of a tying arrangement are described in United States v. Jerrold
Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), and
Earley Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Hesston Corp., 556 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
40. Russian Law, supra note 2, art. 6(2).
41. Id., art. 5(1).
42. CSFR Law, supra note 2, art. 9(3).
43. Restrictions on the behavior of dominant firms are contained in art. 5 of the Polish law and
art. 20 of the Hungarian law. Strictures on tying arrangements are contained in art. 4 of the Polish
law and art. 9 of the Hungarian law.
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in by firms without market power, 44 and since it may be beneficial to society
when used to facilitate entry, the provisions concerning tying in these two laws
may be counterproductive, and may in particular discourage new foreign invest-
ment in these economies.
D. WHAT IS A DOMINANT FIRM?
One danger of a statute that restricts the behavior of dominant firms is that
enforcement agencies or courts may label as dominant firms that really possess
no market power except, for example, the temporarily high market share that
comes with being a successful new entrant into a market. As discussed throughout
this article, each of the laws contains restrictions on the behavior of dominant firms
that are not imposed on other firms, including the possibility of price controls,
output controls, and contract review. 45 If the enforcement authorities and courts
are too quick to attach the label of "dominance" to a firm, if the simple act of
temporary success in entering or competing in a market brings on a regime of
government controls and strictures, then firms will not be so eager to succeed in
the market, and consumers in particular and society in general will be the poorer. 46
How easy is it for a firm with a large market share, however transient, to be
labelled "dominant" under these laws? Under the Hungarian and CSFR laws, it
appears to be very easy. The Hungarian law defines as dominant a firm:
(a) whose commodity cannot be purchased in other markets or only under
much less favorable conditions . . .; or
(b) . . . who orders a commodity not marketable elsewhere or only market-
able under much less favorable conditions than usual . . . ; or
(c) whose share in the market concerned . . . exceeds thirty (30) percent
concerning the given commodity during the period investigated.
47
In addition, a group of three firms may be classified as dominant if they hold a
combined 50 percent market share.48 The use of the disjunctive suggests that the
market share criterion alone may suffice for dominance, leaving only the process
of market definition (necessary for measuring market share) and the definition of
the time period of measuring market share ("during the period investigated") as
safeguards against a swift and arbitrary classification of a successful firm as a
dominant firm.
44. See Schwartz & Eisenstadt, supra note 5, at 87-88.
45. In addition, the laws of both Poland and Russia provide for the antimonopoly authorities to
turn down a merger proposal if the merged firm would hold a dominant position in a market. Polish
Law supra note 2, art. 11; Russian Law supra note 2, art. 11; Russian Law supra note 2, art. 17.
See Russell Pittman, Merger Law in Central and Eastern Europe, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
(1992, forthcoming).
46. See Pittman, supra note 8; see also Willig, supra note 34, at 195 ("Anti-monopoly laws with
broad provisions permitting intervention against dominant-firm behavior . . . pose the danger of
chilling the very investment and entrepreneurship that emerging economies sorely need.").
47. Hungarian Law, supra note 2, § 21(1) (emphasis added).
48. Id. § 21(3).
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The CSFR law is even more clear in its reliance on market share alone. While
a dominant firm is defined implicitly as one "subject to no substantial compe-
tition," 49 the market share requirement appears to be unambiguous: "Dominant
position in the market is held by an entrepreneur who supplies the relevant
market in the course of the calendar year with at least 30 percent of supply of
identical, comparable or mutually commutable goods." 50 Again, only the market
definition process and the time period (here, one year) stand between success in
selling a new product and the strictures of dominant firm regulation.
The Polish law leaves more room for analysis and judgment on the part of the
enforcement agencies and the courts. The law defines a dominant position as
"the position of an economic subject where it does not encounter substantial
competition on the home or local market: it is supposed that the economic subject
has a dominant position, when its market share exceeds thirty percent." 51 The
key word here, of course, is "supposed." The Polish word thus translated,
"domniemywa sie," is typically interpreted in the legal context as establishing a
presumption that may be refuted by contrary evidence. Such a presumption
would then leave the final determination of dominance to agency and court
investigation as to whether "substantial competition" is encountered in the
market-exactly as one would prefer.
The Russian law goes even a step further than the Polish law in this regard.
Dominance is defined as "the exclusive position of an economic subject in a
given market which gives him the ability to exert decisive influence on compe-
tition, impede access to the market on the part of other economic subjects, or in
some other way to limit the freedom of their economic activity." 52 The Russian
Antimonopoly Committee is then directed to define annually a presumptive
market share criterion for dominance for particular markets, with a further pro-
vision allowing a firm that exceeds the threshold level in its market to demon-
strate that it is not a dominant firm. Finally, the committee is forbidden to declare
a firm dominant whose market share does not exceed 35 percent.
The Polish and Russian laws leave ample room for enforcers and courts to
avoid labelling and regulating as dominant those firms that have merely competed
well and succeeded in achieving a high market share. Whether enforcers and
courts will take advantage of this room, of course, remains to be seen. The same
is true of the extent to which the Hungarian and CSFR laws will be interpreted
as requiring, and the extent to which enforcers and courts will be eager to extend,
dominant-firm treatment of such firms. Firms considering making investments in
these countries will eagerly await any indicators as to how these questions will
be resolved.
49. CSFR Law, supra note 2, art. 9(l).
50. Id. art. 9(2) (emphasis added).
51. Polish Law, supra note 2, art. 2(7).
52. Russian Law, supra note 2, art. 4(7).
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E. AGREEMENTS AND DOMINANT FIRMS: WHEN FIRMS Do HAVE MARKET POWER,
CAN THE LAW PROHIBIT THE MOST HARMFUL OF THEIR BEHAVIOR?
Firms with market power can impose significant harm on consumers and on
society as a whole. They may raise prices to monopoly levels, fail to keep costs
low, and fail to engage in technological progress. Most of Western antimonopoly
law is aimed at either preventing the creation of market power or regulating its
exercise once it has been created.
However, law enforcers in Central and Eastern Europe will face some unique
problems with respect to market power. One set of problems will arise from the
fact that many firms will have market power derived not from anything remotely
related to their success in satisfying consumer needs but only from their history
as a state-owned and state-protected monopoly. Such monopolies, if they survive
the privatization process (or as they await the privatization process), will typi-
cally be unable to compete with the products of western manufacturers53 and so
may seek to prevent the entry of such manufacturers (whether by import or by
setting up new manufacturing facilities) into their markets. A likely strategy for
this purpose may be the effectuation of exclusive supply arrangements with
suppliers of critical raw materials and exclusive distributorship arrangements
with wholesalers and retailers. An alternative strategy would be ownership of
either such input sources or outlets; such ownership may be an artifact of the
command system, in which state-owned firms were typically "overly" inte-
grated in order to assure themselves of input supplies.54 Such arrangements
53. See, e.g., ZDENEK DRABEK & ANDRZEJ OLECHOWSKI, PRICE AND QUALITY COMPETITIVENESS
OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' EXPORTS (World Bank, Policy, Planning, & Research Working Paper No.
317, Dec. 1989); PAUL HARE & GORDON HUGHES, COMPETITIVENESS AND INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND POLAND 727 (Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion
Paper No. 543, Apr. 1991); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD BANK, ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AND EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DE-
VELOPMENT, 3 A STUDY OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY 289-90 (1991) [hereinafter SOVtET ECONOMY
STUDY]; M. MYANT, THE TRANSITION TO THE MARKET IN POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 12-13
(Paisley College of Technology, Dept. of Economics and Management, Working Paper #20, May
1991); UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, POLAND: MANAGING THE TRAN-
SmON TO A MARKET ECONOMY 67-70 (Industrial Development Review Series) (1991); The Force of
Inertia, GAZETA BANKOWA, Sept. 1-7, 1991, at 16; Helen B. Junz, Integration of Eastern Europe
into the World Trading System, 81 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.), May 1991, at 176, 177; Jan
Svejnar, Microeconomic Issues in the Transition to a Market Economy, 5 J. ECON. PERS. 123, 128
(1991); Vladimir Tsapelik & Andrei lakovlev, Monopoly in the Soviet Economy: Sources, Forms and
Ways of Overcoming It, 34 PROBS. OF ECON. 31 (1991).
54. See, e.g., A.N. Yelimov, Spetsializat i kooperirovaniye na sovremennom etape (Specializa-
tion and Cooperation at the Present State), in 3 EKONOMIKA I ORGANIZATSIYA PROMYSHLENNOGO
PROIZVODSTVA 22-38 (March 1987); E. BENNATHAN ET AL., REFORMING AND PRIVATIZING POLAND'S
ROAD FREIGHT INDUSTRY iii, 28, 30 (World Bank, Policy, Research, & External Affairs Working
Paper No. 750, Aug. 1991); STANLEY FISCHER, PRIVATIZATION IN EAST EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #3703, May 1991) in EMERGENCE OF
MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 34, at 233, 235; Kenneth R. Gray, Report on the Conference
on the Social Collection of Rent in Eastern Europe and the USSR, 50 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 148, 154
(1991); SOVIET ECONOMY STUDY, supra note 59, at 293; Kroll, supra note 3, at 146; Martin Spechler,
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would then require a firm seeking to enter a market at one stage, already a
daunting proposition in these countries, with their underdeveloped financial,
transportation, and housing infrastructures and markets, 55 to enter at other stages
as well, thus making entry that much more difficult. One determinant of the
success of antimonopoly laws in helping to build efficient market economies will
be the degree to which the laws prohibit such entry-blocking behavior and the
authorities enforce such provisions.
Each of the laws under examination in this article contains provisions that may
be used by prospective entrants or antimonopoly authorities to attack this kind of
behavior by dominant market incumbents; each also has language whose inter-
pretation will be an important determinant of the success of these attacks.
The Polish law prohibits dominant firms from "refusing to sell or purchase
commodities in a manner discriminating [against] certain economic subjects
when there are no alternative supply sources or outlets" 56 and from "counter-
ing the formation of conditions indispensable for [the] emergence or develop-
ment of competition."- 57 The first could be used only against dominant firms
that are vertically integrated, since if a dominant firm signed an exclusive
distributorship arrangement with a network of wholesalers it would not be the
dominant firm that was "refusing to .. .purchase commodities" from the
prospective entrant. In addition, proving to a court that "alternative supply
sources or outlets" are available, may be a difficult task; presumably the law is
intended to address situations where there are no economically relevant alterna-
tives, or alternatives that would allow the discriminated-against firm to compete
in the relevant market. Nevertheless, the second provision, if appropriately
interpreted by enforcers and the courts, may be ideally suited for the protection
of competition in this way.
Competition and Structural Change in Eastern Europe, 6 REV. INDUS. ORGANIZATION 189, 195 (1991);
Jam Tomorrow, THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER, LTD., Sept. 21, 1991, (Business in Eastern Europe;
Survey), at 3, 17.
55. See, e.g., FISCHER, supra note 54, at 231, 243; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SERVICES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (1991);
POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, THE COMPETITION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 2 (n.d.); JEFFREY P. TEL-
GARSKY & RAYMOND J. STRUYK, TOWARD A MARKET-ORIENTED HOUSING SECTOR IN EASTERN EUROPE
(1991); Avishay Braverman & J. Luis Guasch, Agricultural Reform in Developing Countries: Re-
flections for Eastern Europe, 72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1243, 1247 (1990); Irwin L. Collier & Horst
Siebert, The Economic Integration of Post-Wall Germany, 81 AM. ECON, REV. (PAPERS & PROC.),
May 1991, at 196, 199; Csaba Cski, Agricultural Changes in Eastern Europe at the Beginning of
the 1990s, 72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1233, 1240-41 (1990); Robert Pitofsky & Harvey J. Gold-
schmid, Azerbaijanian-American Symposium: The Road to Economic Renewal, INT'L MERGER L.,
Sept. 1991; Svejnar, supra note 53, at 129-31; Jan Winiecki, Post-Soviet-Type Economies in Tran-
sition: What Have We Learned from the Polish Transition Programme in Its First Year? 126 REVIEW
OF WORLD ECON. 765, 784 (1990); Stephen Engelberg, Poland's Cure Is Taking, but Side Effects
Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at 1; Jam Tomorrow, supra note 60, at 20, 25, Svilen B. Parvulov,
Condition and Likely Influence of Monopoly on the Bulgarian Economy 10 (1991) (unpublished
paper, Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 3 Aksakov St., Sofia 1000, Bulgaria)
(copy on file with Russell Pittman).
56. Polish Law, supra note 2, art. 5(4).
57. Id. art. 5(1).
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Similarly, the Hungarian law has a provision that may apply to vertically
integrated dominant firms refusing entrants access to their captive suppliers or
distributors: dominant firms are forbidden to "refuse in an unjustified manner to
enter into an agreement." 58 Nonintegrated dominant firms that seek to use ver-
tical agreements to deny to prospective entrants inputs or distribution may be
prosecuted under the provision prohibiting "hamper[ing] access to the market" 5 9
or "creat[ing] an unmotivated disadvantageous market position for the compe-
tition."60 Also similar to the Polish law, words like "unjustified" and "unmo-
tivated" will be important ones for the enforcers and the courts to define in a
procompetitive manner.61
The CSFR law addresses vertically integrated dominant firms with the provision
that dominant firms may not apply "differing conditions for equal or comparable
fulfillment towards individual members in the market, which results in their dis-
advantage in economic competition." 62 Exclusionary behavior by nonintegrated
dominant firms, however, will apparently be checked only by the general language
stating that "[m]onopolistic or dominant position must not be misused by an
entrepreneur to the detriment of other entrepreneurs or consumers, or to detriment
of public interests." 63 Again, the words "comparable" and "disadvantage" in
the first provision, and the word "misused" and the concept of public "detri-
ment" in the second, await enforcement agency and court interpretation.
Finally, the Russian law forbids dominant firms, vertically integrated or not,
from the "creation of obstacles to market entry ...for other economic sub-
jects."64 It also addresses exclusionary behavior by nonintegrated dominant firms
in the already-discussed prohibition of "agreements . . .between noncompeting
economic subjects, one of which occupies a dominant position . . . . and the
other of which is its supplier or customer, if such agreements . . . have or may
have as their result a significant limitation of competition."
65
If such provisions in these four laws are interpreted procompetitively, pro-
spective entrants will be protected from entry-deterring agreements, restraints,
and other behavior on the part of incumbent dominant firms.
F. DOMINANT FIRMS: IS INNOCENT, PROCOMPETITIVE
BEHAVIOR SUSPECT?
The provisions just discussed are a double-edged sword. They may indeed be
used to protect competition, if they are enforced against existing monopolies that
58. Hungarian Law, supra note 2, § 20(b).
59. Id. § 20(d).
60. Id. § 20(e).
61. On this point, see also the discussion in the next section concerning the harming of com-
petitors.
62. CSFR Law, supra note 2, art. 9(3)(c).
63. Id. art. 9(3).
64. Russian Law, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
65. Id. art. 6(2).
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seek to deny inputs or outlets to prospective entrants into their markets, but they
may harm competition if they are enforced against normal, procompetitive be-
havior by a firm with a large market share. In particular, there is a danger in the
language of all of these laws that harming a competitor is a violation of the
antimonopoly laws. Since competitors are typically harmed when a firm lowers
the price of its product or improves its quality, such an interpretation would
discourage the outcomes that policymakers are seeking with their conversion to
a market economy.
The Polish law prohibits a firm in a dominant position from "countering the
formation of conditions indispensable for emergence or development of compe-
tition." 66 If a firm sells a high-quality product at a low price, that is presumably
less conducive to the "emergence or development of competition" than if it sells
a low-quality product at a high price. Is it an antitrust offense for a dominant firm
to sell products that satisfy consumers?
Similarly, the Hungarian law prohibits a firm in a dominant position from
"hamper[ing] access to the market" 67 or "creat[ing] an unmotivated disadvan-
tageous market position for the competition." 68 Further, the provisions of the law
concerning unfair competition prohibit any firm from "appeal[ing] to another
person in an unfair manner so as to prevent somebody from entering into a
business relation or to cause an existing relation [to be] terminated. ' 69 In the
same spirit, the CSFR law prohibits the use of a dominant position "to the
detriment of other entrepreneurs," 70 and the Russian law proscribes a dominant
firm from "encroachment upon the interests of other economic subjects. '" 71 Is
producing such a good product that market entry is "hampered" an antitrust
offense? Should "detriment" to one's competitors or "encroachment upon
[their] interests," be regarded as antitrust offenses?
Private litigants may try to convince both the enforcement agencies and the
courts that this should indeed be the case, and it will be important for the
protection of the competitive process that they fail. For if firms are punished
simply for entering a market and succeeding too well, other firms will be deterred
from entering other markets, and the economy will stagnate.72
66. Polish Law, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
67. Hungarian Law, supra note 2, § 20(d).
68. Id. § 20(e).
69. Id. § 6.
70. CSFR Law, supra note 2, art. 9(3).
71. Russian Law, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
72. Cf. Ass't Att'y Gen. James F. Rill, The Role of Antitrust Law in the United States Economy,
Remarks to Seminar on Competition Policy, Ministry of Commerce & Industrial Development,
Mexico City, Mexico (Nov. 15, 1990) ("A fundamental and long-recognized principle of antitrust
law, at least as it has evolved in the United States, is that its purpose is to protect the process of
competition, not to protect individual competitors at the expense of efficiency and innovation."); Fox
& Ordover, supra note I ("The danger should be recognized that firms will complain about com-
petition itself and will use the process of government to protect themselves from efficient and
legitimate rivalry. If competitors' complaints are all treated as worth, rivals will be induced to pull
their punches lest they be penalized for their procompetitive acts.").
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G. DOES THE ANTIMONOPOLY COMMITTEE CONTROL
THE PRICES OF DOMINANT FIRMS?
Central and Eastern European enforcers need no lectures from westerners
concerning the efficiency of markets in determining prices and the advantages of
markets over governmental price controls; they have been reading (and writing)
such lectures in their own countries for some time now. 73 Still there are indica-
tions that policymakers have not entirely abandoned the habit of seeking to use
government to control the individual economic decisions of firms, and this is
evident in the four antimonopoly laws under examination here. All have provi-
sions that call either explicitly or implicitly for government control of the prices
of some firms, and if these provisions are strictly enforced the economies may
suffer in three ways: first, from continued bureaucratic interference with the
market mechanism; second, from increased costs as firms devote resources to
dealing with regulators; and third, from structural improvements forgone, as
hard-pressed antimonopoly agencies devote resources to regulating prices at the
expense of other antimonopoly enforcement.
The Polish and Hungarian laws are most explicit in their provisions for con-
trols on the prices charged by some firms. The Polish law forbids firms in a
monopolistic position, that is, firms "not encounter[ing] any competition on the
home or local market," 74 from "limiting production, sales or purchase of com-
modities, despite the capacities they have, in particular when it leads to [a] price
increase; refraining from the sale of commodities to increase prices; [or] asking
extremely high prices. ' 75 The Polish Antimonopoly Office has already issued
several orders seeking to enforce these provisions, including a decision that the
District Cereal Mill Plant "PZZ" in Bialystok "should stop restricted and dis-
continued sale of rapeseed, despite being able to do so, in order to raise its
price,"76 and a similar decision against the passenger automobile factory FSO.
7 7
In both of these cases the Antimonopoly Court has overruled the decision of the
Antimonopoly Office.78
The Hungarian law provides that no firm, regardless of market share, may
"withdraw a commodity from circulation or withhold it prior to a planned price
rise and/or with an aim to induce a price increase." 79 Dominant firms are guilty
73. See, e.g., THE ANTI-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Lev Timofeger ed., 1990); Viclav Klaus, The
Imperatives of Long-Term Prognosis and the Dominant Characteristics of the Present Economy
(Imperativy diouhodobe prognozy a dominantni charakterisiky soucasen ekonomiky), 28 E. EUR.
ECON. 49 (1990); Tsapelik & Iakovlev, supra note 53, at 40-41; Anna Fornalczyk, Antimonopoly
Office and Competition Policy, Remarks to Conference on Competition Laws and Practice within
Europe and the United States of America, Tatranskd Lomnica, CSFR (Oct. 2-5, 1991), at 8.
74. Polish Law, supra note 2, art. 2(6).
75. Id. art. 7(1).
76. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, THE ACTIVITY OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE (n.d.).
77. The FSO case is described in Fox & Ordover, supra note 1, at 21.
78. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 76.
79. Hungarian Law, supra note 2, § 8 (part of the chapter of the law addressing "unfair
competition").
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of violating the law "if the difference in value between the service and its
compensation ... is markedly high." 80 As if to confirm that enforcing such
provisions requires the expenditure of significant resources on the part of the
enforcement authorities, the law goes on to note that "[i]n order to identify this,
the circumstances of the agreement's conclusion, its overall contents, the
turnover- and price-relations as well as particular features of the business and the
mode of defining the service and its compensation, shall be investigated.'
The CSFR and Russian laws may also be interpreted as calling for or permit-
ting price controls, but here the language is at least open to interpretation. The
CSFR law prohibits dominant firms from "enforcing of disproportionate condi-
tions in contracts with other members of the market, particularly enforcing of
fulfillment which, at the time of the concluding of the contract, is strikingly out
of proportion as against provided compensation," 8 2 and "closing or limiting
production, sale or technological development of goods in order to achieve
unjustifiable economic advantage at the cost of customers." 8 3
Similarly, the Russian law prohibits to dominant firms the "withdrawal of
goods from circulation with the goal of creation or support of a shortage on the
market, or the increase of prices;,, 8 4 and the "violation of established normative
acts on the procedure for price formation." 85
One may argue that such provisions, and their enforcement, are part of the
political compromises necessary to alleviate popular concerns about the costs of
transition to a market economy. One may argue too that during the formative
period of a market economy, when the lack of infrastructure renders entry dif-
ficult into most markets in the economy, completely free prices should not be
insisted upon even by the economic purist. 86 One also may be hopeful that the
preconditions for application of these provisions, monopoly in the Polish law,
dominance (for the most part) in the others, will be less easily satisfied as time
passes. And one may urge that any enforcement under these provisions be aimed
at incumbent monopolists left over from the socialist economy rather than at
successful new market entrants. The point is that price controls are one more
enforcement weapon that, if resorted to excessively by the authorities, will
discourage the entry of new firms into the economy and prevent the realization
of the hopes of the populace for economic improvements.
80. Id. § 22.
81. Id.
82. CSFR Law, supra note 2, art. 9(3)(a).
83. Id. art. 9(3)(d).
84. Russian Law, supra note 2, art. 5(1).
85. Id.
86. High prices perform two important functions in a market economy: (1) they signal to po-
tential suppliers that more of a good may be profitably sold in a market, thus inducing entry; and
(2) they allocate the scarce good among demanders. If the overall difficulty of entry renders the first
function ineffectual, it is not obvious that the second is always better performed by high prices than
by other mechanisms (for example, rationing by coupon or queue). See Pittman, supra note 8.
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III. Conclusion
Even within Western societies, people disagree concerning both the appropri-
ate goals of antimonopoly law and the appropriate analytical framework for their
achievement. However, most Westerners agree on two principles: such laws
should seek to discourage monopolistic and collusive behavior that genuinely
harms the public, but such laws should also create an atmosphere conducive to
the entry of new firms and the hard, fair competition of existing firms. In this
article I have examined four Central and Eastern European antimonopoly laws in
the context of these principles and suggested enforcement and judicial interpre-
tations of statutory language consistent with them. Economist Ronald Coase has
been quoted as saying that "if an economist delays the adoption of a bad law by
one week, he has earned his lifetime salary several times over." 87 Although the
goal of this article is to encourage the adoption of good laws and good interpre-
tations of existing laws, the measure of a successful outcome will be the same.
87. Interview with George Stigler, 15 REASON 44, 45 (1984).
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